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Abstract: The paper explores the successful European scheme for the authorisation of 
pharmaceuticals within the Single Market. Theoretically, it argues that successful regulati-
on requires the exclusion of parochial interests from the decision process and the strict 
limitation of the agency's opportunities to adopt arbitrary decisions. Empirically, it holds 
that these conditions are fulfilled in the European authorisation scheme. The European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) enjoys a strong agenda-setting 
power, while it is locked into a control arrangement that precludes arbitrary decisions. Mo-
reover, all actors involved in the decision-making process are bound to a coherent and 
detailed set of legally binding decision-making criteria as well as subject to judicial review. 
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1. Introduction 
The lack of independence of the EMEA casts doubt on the widespread theoretical as-
sumption that regulatory agencies must be largely independent in order to perform their 
regulatory functions successfully. In the analysis of domestic regulatory agencies, the de-
gree of independence from government and parliamentary majorities is emphasised (Gi-
lardi 2002, Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Usually, it is assumed that regulatory deci-
sions will improve if intervention of actors with parochial interests is precluded (Majone 
1996). It is argued that a regulatory agency, like an independent central bank, ought to act 
as a fiduciary of the long-term interests of its principal with a considerable margin of dis-
cretion at its disposal (Majone 2001). The virtually undisputed success of the European 
authorisation scheme for pharmaceuticals suggests that agency independence is not a 
necessary ingredient in successful European regulation.  
The present paper explores why the centralised European system for the authorisation of 
pharmaceuticals with the EMEA in its centre is comparatively successful. First, it exam-
ines the arguments for independence of regulatory agencies as well as the arguments for 
its close control, and concludes that needed is both as much exclusion of parochial inter-
ests from the decision process as possible and the strict limitation of opportunities for the 
agency to adopt arbitrary decisions. Actors must be forced to engage in the common 
search of the most appropriate solution of a decision-making problem (section 2). Subse-
quently, the paper examines how the centralized procedure for the authorisation of inno-
vative medicinal products ensures that adequate solutions to the decision problems are 
identified. It is argued that the procedure mobilizes several mechanisms that hinder the 
actors involved from exploiting their status within the centralised authorisation procedure 
to promote their parochial interests and force them into a discourse about the application 
of substantive rules. While the EMEA enjoys the position of a strong agenda-setter, it is 
locked into a control arrangement that precludes arbitrary decisions. In addition, all actors 
involved are bound to a coherent and detailed set of substantive decision-making criteria, 
which are enshrined in European directives and regulations subject to judicial review by 
the European Courts (section 3).  
2. The Question of Regulatory Independence 
Principal-agent theory consists of two mutually incompatible strands of argumentation. 
While one of them advocates independent regulatory agencies, the other insists of the 
necessity to oversee and control public bureaucracies (1). However, reliable regulation will 
need both independence from parochial interests and close oversight of agencies (2).  
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2.1  Arguments for Independence and Control of Regulatory Agencies 
The reason for the widespread claim that successful regulation requires independent 
agencies is the problem of inconsistent preferences. In modern regulatory theory, it is 
widely assumed that independent regulatory agencies are better suited to regulate suc-
cessfully than tightly controlled state bureaucracies (e.g. Majone 1996 and 2001, Thatcher 
1998). As long as preferences are coherent, it would be unreasonable for a principal, say, 
a parliamentary majority or the member states of the EU, to delegate implementation de-
cisions to highly independent agencies. However, the interests of a principal are not al-
ways coherent. In many cases, long-term interests militate against situation-specific short-
term interests (Elster 1979: 67-68, Keech 1995: 38-40). For example, a state or govern-
ment faced with a case of hostage-taking might tend to negotiate in order to safe the lives 
of hostages, even though the development of a reputation of negotiating provides a strong 
incentives to incur future crimes. In this type of situation, an actor may pursue his short-
term preferences only at the expense of his long-term interests - and vice versa.  
2.2 Institutional Requirements of a Reliable Regulatory Arrangement 
First, the arrangement ought to protect the agency as far as possible against intervention 
of parochial interests in order to provide sufficient freedom to produce decisions irrespec-
tive of their distributive consequences. This does not imply that all possible stakeholders, 
in particular the member states, are excluded from the decision process. Typically, stake-
holders possess information that is relevant for proper decision-making. What matters is 
that interventions are limited to the submission of convincing arguments, rather than the 
employment of power resources. Second, the arrangement ought to provide for sufficient 
oversight to create effective incentives for the agency to orient its decisions along the 
long-term interest of its principals, and to refrain from pursuing its own interests or being 
captured by powerful stakeholders. An arrangement providing for mechanisms to reject 
decisions that do not meet the long-term community interests will not at all be counterpro-
ductive, even if it involves stakeholders, as long as their intervention helps enhance the 
accountability of the agency. However, it will be necessary to firmly commit all actors in-
volved in the decision-making process, not merely the agency, to the long-term communi-
ty interests.  
Third, the long-term community interests in regard to a particular decision ought to be 
readily clear. The margin for arbitrary decision-making as well as for intervention of power 
and parochial interests will grow, if sufficiently precise standards are absent or if multiple 
standards contradict each other (Shapiro 1997). To protect its own legitimacy and e-
xistence, an agency will tend to refrain from overexploiting its margin of free choice, if so-
lutions meeting the community interest are readily distinguishable from those that do not. 
In principal-agent theory, it is increasingly recognised that the substantive requirements of 
statutes provide principals with a highly effective instrument to guide agency decision-
making without having to intervene into the particular decision process (Huber et al. 
2001). Moreover, substantive rules reflecting an established long-term community interest 
constitute externally given standards on which a discursive exchange of arguments can 
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rely. The 'giving-reasons requirement' (Shapiro 1992) supports this effect because it 
forces the actors involved to justify their decisions convincingly.  
3. Centralised European Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Agency,  
Member State Control and Substantive Standards 
3.1  The Agency as a Powerful Agenda-Setter 
Figure 1: Centralised Authorisation Procedure for Pharmaceuticals 
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However, four features of the centralised authorisation procedure reinforce the agenda-
setting power of the EMEA and its expert committee in the centralised authorisation pro-
cedure. They contribute to the fact that its scientific opinions cannot as easily be ignored 
by the other actors, as would be the case in a regular Comitology procedure. First, the 
application of a marketing authorisation is directly addressed at the EMEA and not, for 
instance, at the Commission. This is partly due to the fact that the regulation of pharma-
ceuticals includes pre-market authorisation and is not limited solely to post-market control 
as in most other regulatory areas (Krücken 1997). As a result, the agency and its expert 
committee are not only always involved in the authorisation process. They operate at the 
first stage of the decision-making procedure and set the agenda for the following actors by 
their scientific opinions. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional committee system, 
where the Commission is almost free to consult the expertise of scientific committees at 
will and enjoys the true agenda-setting power (Krapohl 2003). 
Second, the scientific opinion on an application is elaborated within the EMEA by the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products. Its members act in a personal capacity, but 
they are not independent scientists. They shall be recruited from the regulatory agencies 
of the member states. As a consequence, committee members may draw upon the appa-
ratus of their national regulatory agencies to process the overwhelming amount of infor-
mation included in a average application of some 250.000 pages. Accordingly, a draft opi-
nion elaborated by a rapporteur and a co-rapporteur are scrutinised from the perspectives 
of a variety of different national regulatory cultures and experiences. Decisions agreed 
upon within the Committee are acceptable to at least a majority of domestic regulatory 
agencies, and are difficult to challenge by the Commission or the member state commit-
tee. Hence, elaboration of the scientific opinion relies on an institutionalised network of 
member state regulatory agencies (Dehousse 1997, Majone 1997).  
1. EMEA 
with Administrative 
Support  
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Due to its composition, the EMEA-Committee might seem to provide just another forum 
for intergovernmental negotiations (Kelemen 2002). Although its members act in a perso-
nal capacity and shall not accept orders by their member states or their domestic agency, 
a committee of national experts seems to be less independent from member states’ inte-
rests than a committee of independent scientists might be. However, there is no indication 
that the committee is significantly misused by member states pursuing their parochial inte-
rests. A consensual decision-making style points to the fact that committee members tend 
to argue about validity claims. As indicated in Table 1, a vast majority (ca. 90%) of opini-
ons were adopted by unanimity. Just below 10% of all decisions were taken by a majority 
vote. The share of majority votes increases slightly in the case of decisions addressing 
restrictions of an authorisation. If the committee members intended to misuse the forum to 
bargain over state interests or national regulatory cultures, majority voting might be expec-
ted to prevail. Rational actors can be expected stop bargaining, if a sufficiently high majo-
rity has been gathered. Likewise, decisions based upon bargaining power and parochial 
interests would frequently not be acceptable to all committee members, because larger 
packages are difficult to put together.  
Table 1: Table 1: Decision-Making within Expert Committee1 
Opinion of the Expert Committee 
Decision 
Authorisation 
Authorisation 
with  
Restrictions 
No  
Authorisation2 
Total 
Unanimity 142 76 1 219 90,5% 
Majority Vote 10 7  17 7,0% 
Appeal Proce-
dure3  3 3 6 2,5% 
Total 152 62,8% 86 35,5% 4 1,7% 242 
 
Third, it is difficult for the Commission to deviate from the EMEA opinion because it is 
obliged to justify this step on the basis of the rules of the authorisation procedure. In case 
of scientific doubt, it cannot amend the opinion but must refer the matter back to the 
EMEA. Further, the Standing Committee representing member state interests is envisa-
ged to decide in written procedure, but a meeting of will be called, if the Commission pro-
posal deviates from the scientific opinion. Altogether, the procedure provides strong incen-
tives for the Commission to stick to the EMEA opinion rather than to deviate from it. Once 
again, the agenda-setting power of the agency is increased. Empirical data confirm this 
finding. Table 2 indicates that not a single Commission proposal submitted until May 2001 
deviated from the scientific opinion of the agency committee and no such deviation is 
                                                 
1 Figures result from a dataset that includes all authorisations adopted under the centralised authorisation 
procedure from the setting into force of the procedure in 1995 until the end of 2002. The data were collected 
by the authors on the basis of EMEA publications on the Internet (www.emea.eu.int). 
2 The small number of negative decisions is due to the fact that most companies withdraw their application to 
prevent that failing applications is published, if the committee indicates to take a negative decision. 
3 All appeal procedures were initiated after a majority vote in the expert committee. The applying companies 
usually do not appeal against a negative decision by unanimity because of the low probability of  success. 
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known for the time thereafter. Consequently, the EMEA-committee throughout pre-
determined the decisions of the Standing Committee. 
Table 2: Decisions by Commission and Member State Committee4 
Authorisation decisions until 1st May 2001 262 
Deviation of the Commission from the opinion of the expert committee 0 
Negative vote of the member states committee on a Commission’s 
proposal 
0 
Meeting of the member states committee 9 (3,44%) 
Qualified majority vote of the member states committee 5 (1,91%) 
 
Fourth, the centralised authorisation procedure does not envisage that member states 
meet and discuss authorisation decisions within the Standing Committee. They shall deci-
de in a written procedure unless the Commission deviates from the EMEA opinion (which 
it never does), if a member state indicates objections, or if the matter is highly urgent. Nor-
mally, member states merely receive the Commission proposal and must react within 30 
days, if they have objections against it. If no member state indicates any objections, the 
decision is passed automatically. Even if the committee operates formally according to the 
most restrictive of all Comitology procedures (Franchino 2000, Steunenberg et al. 1996), it 
rarely decides anything in practice. Table 2 shows that the committee decided in 253 out 
of 262 authorisation decisions in the written procedure and met just for nine applications. 
Four of these nine decisions received unanimous support, while merely five were taken by 
a qualified majority. Not a single decision proposal was eventually rejected by the commit-
tee and none was referred to the Council. Consequently, all final decisions originating 
from the centralised authorisation procedure were identical with the respective scientific 
opinions elaborated by the EMEA-Committee.  
3.2 Legally Binding Substantive Standards Limit the Room for Manoeuvre 
As the substantive standards are legally binding, the European courts join the ‘authorisa-
tion game’ as additional players and will have the last word on whether standards have 
been correctly applied or not. An applicant company is entitled to be authorised to market 
its medicinal product, unless the criteria of safety, efficacy and quality are not met. Hence, 
at least a badly reasoned negative authorisation decision can easily be brought before the 
European Court of First Instance, or in second instance to the European Court of Justice 
(Collatz 1996: 134). Legal standing of applicants is based upon the fact that they are the 
immediate addressees of the Commission decisions. Practically, they are in need of legal 
protection because they will usually have incurred costs of many million Euros for re-
search and development of an innovative medicinal product. Hypothetically, a member 
state could also instigate court proceedings against an allegedly wrong authorisation deci-
sion.  
                                                 
4 Figures are provided by the Commission: COM 2001 (404) final, 26.11.2001: 8-9. They include the decisions 
according to the centralised procedure and the arbitration procedure. Other data about the political phase of 
the procedure are not available. Note that the arbitration procedure operates exactly the same way as the 
centralised authorisation procedure. 
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3.3  The Significance of Informal Substantive Standards 
In spite of its detailed provisions, the code spelling out the substantive criteria for the as-
sessment of the safety, efficacy and quality of pharmaceuticals does not fully abolish the 
discretion of the expert committee. This is especially due to the fact that an application to 
a medicinal product always requires a trade-off between the general principles of safety 
and efficacy. The more effective a product is, the more side-effects will it usually cause 
(Heilmann 2002). If effects have always to be weighed against side-effects, there will be 
no single best solution, but a range of possible ways of accommodating the contradictory 
principles. The task of balancing principles creates room for manoeuvre for the expert 
committee.  
Instead of exploiting this room for manoeuvre in an ad hoc fashion, the expert committee 
voluntarily limits its own discretion in the single application case by a great number of 
rules of different type. These rules are far more detailed than the substantive decision-
making criteria of the Community code for medicinal products for human use. Usually, 
they are elaborated by various working groups of the expert committee, partly in order to 
provide advise to future applicants, and some emerge from the international conference 
on harmonisation (ICH) founded by the United States, Japan and the EU to harmonise 
their national (or supranational) authorisations of medicinal products as a first step to-
wards a global market for pharmaceuticals. The rules are published on the EMEA home-
page even in draft stages in order to allow interested circles to comment and react upon 
them. As table 3 indicates, the expert committee developed an extensive set of rules of 
different type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: Informal Decision-Making Rules of the Expert Committee at 1st June 20035 
 
Working Group Guidelines Points to Consider Position Papers and Statements Working 
Group 
Ad-opted Draft Concept Paper Adopted Draft 
Concept 
Paper Adopted Draft 
Concept 
Paper Adopted Draft 
% 
Efficacy 6 3 3 2  2 4 1 1 1  7,49 
Quality 34 3 11 18 5 5 1     25,08 
Pharmaco-
vigilianz 22 4 6    1   1  11,07 
Blood 
Products 4  1    2   1  2,61 
Biotechno-
logy 12 9          6,84 
ICH 12 3 2 4  5 13   11  16,29 
Herbal 
Medicines 50 1        4 3 18,89 
General 1 1  1   1   1  1,63 
Herbal 
Medicines 2      1     0,98 
General 3      8   17  9,12 
%  62,87 13,68 10,75 12,7 100% 
 
                                                 
5 Figures stem from a dataset including all informal decision-making rules published by the EMEA (www.emea.eu.int) at 1.6.2003. In addition, rules for ‚Good Manufacturing Practices’ are published by 
the Commission, which specify the Directive 91/356/EEC and create binding EU law. 
  
Despite their informality, these rules create a binding force on the expert committee and 
cannot be ignored or changed at will. The rules are not legally binding and do not change 
the legal position of any other actor involved, be it the member states, the Commission, or 
the applicant. They are not reinforced by judicial review, because the task of rule-making 
is not formally assigned to the agency. The creation of their de facto binding force on the 
committee is based upon at least three interrelated mechanisms. First, the rules constitute 
the principal instrument of the EMEA to inform possible applicants of additional criteria 
upon which its scientific opinion will be based. It will simply smoothen the authorization 
process if applicants become aware of data to be submitted and tests to be passed as 
well as of products without a prospect of being approved. Moreover, it reinforces the at-
tractiveness of the new European authorisation procedure which is partly competing with 
domestic authorisations. And vice versa: Applying firms will voluntarily attempt to fulfil the 
requirements of these rules, if the committee credibly promises to apply them in its deci-
sions. Otherwise, they would have to persuade the committee of the adequacy of their 
own way of proving the safety, efficacy and quality of their products. However, there would 
be no incentive of the applying companies to follow the rules, if the committee were ex-
pected to change them from case to case, or if it adopted decisions in contradiction to its 
own rules. Hence, the committee develops a strong interest in committing itself to the sin-
cere application of its own rules.  
Second, the decision situation within the expert committee militates for the development 
of, and adherence to, rules because interests are difficult to accommodate within the sin-
gle case-specific decisions. If the committee is interested in developing the reputation as a 
scientifically oriented expert committee rather than an intergovernmental bargaining fo-
rum, it must strive for consensual decisions. Accordingly, contradictory national prefer-
ences or domestic authorisation cultures must be reconciled in almost every single case. 
If every single decision threatens to leave some actors aggrieved because the room for 
'deals' is narrow, consensus formation cannot predominantly be based upon balancing 
interests in an ad hoc fashion. An emerging minority will tend to accept even an unwel-
come decision, if it is compatible with accepted rules and principles.  
Third, while position papers and statements can be adopted ad hoc by the expert commit-
tee, the most important sets of rules enshrined in guidelines and points to consider docu-
ments are developed in a formal administrative procedure, which includes the consultation 
of stakeholders, such as pharmaceutical companies or the authorisation bodies of the 
member states.6 This procedure takes a longer period of time than a centralised authorisa-
tion procedure. Accordingly, these rules reflect a high degree of commitment and cannot 
be changed for every single new decision.  
3.4 Further Improvement through a More Independent Agency ? 
One of the most important institutional innovations in the European Union during the last 
decade is the emergence of supranational regulatory agencies. Currently, six agencies 
                                                 
6 CPMP/2024/98: Standing Operating Procedure for Developing CPMP Guidelines and Points to Consider Documents. 
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with regulatory competencies exist within the Single Market, including the European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. Other agencies, like the European Envi-
ronment Agency and the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work fulfil different 
functions such as information gathering and promotion of the social dialogue (Kreher 
1997, Everson et al. 1999). In its White Paper on Governance (European Commission 
2001), the Commission announced to propose further agencies to enhance the efficacy 
and transparency of regulatory policy-making. At its summit in December 2003 in Rome, 
the European Council commissioned no less than nine locations for new regulatory agen-
cies. Hence, agencies constitute an increasingly widespread institutional arrangement for 
regulation in the Single Market.  
The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) is a prominent 
example of supranational regulatory agencies (Gardner 1996, Feick 2000a). Founded in 
1993, it may be conceived of as the blueprint of future agencies. It constitutes the corner-
stone of the European authorisation system for pharmaceuticals and has significantly con-
tributed to the emergence of a single market for these products, which had been blocked 
for many years by divergent domestic regulations. Moreover, stakeholders related to the 
sector, including competent authorities of the member states as well as producers and 
patient associations, generally appreciate the new authorisation system (Cameron 
McKenna and Anderson Consulting 2001). However, the status of the EMEA vis-à-vis the 
political actors is a far cry from the independence of the European System of Central 
Banks and independent agencies within the United States (Shapiro 1997). While it enjoys 
remarkably far-reaching competencies (Everson 1996, Majone 1997), it is by far not as 
independent as it may seem at first glance. The Member states refrained from giving up 
their control of the decision process (see Keleman 2002). Consequently, the EMEA is part 
of two multi-tier decision-making processes in which both the member states and the 
Commission are involved. 
The paper concludes that the system at large, not merely the EMEA, ensures the produc-
tion of reasonable outcomes irrespective of their distributive consequences. The combina-
tion of a skilfully constructed control chain involving different actors and detailed substan-
tive decision-making criteria leads to results that are at least as reliable as decisions pro-
duced by a fully independent agency because parochial interests are excluded while a 
powerful accountability system is established. 
Authorization of pharmaceuticals raises the problem of inconsistent interests. As demon-
strated by the Thalomide (or Contergan) scandal of the 1960s, pharmaceuticals can be 
extremely harmful (e.g. Kirk 1999). Not only are biologically or chemically highly active 
substances deliberately incorporated, but consumers will usually be unable to judge the 
quality of medicinal products themselves, so that information asymmetries between pro-
ducers and consumers exist (Feick 2000b). The regulation of these products according to 
reliable and comparatively strict standards should be in the long-term interests of the 
community. However, clinical testing of pharmaceuticals is extremely expensive and pro-
ducers may depend economically on the authorization of a particular product. Patients 
might eagerly await authorization of a pharmaceutical promising to cure a dangerous dis-
ease. Hence, decision-makers may be under considerable pressure from interest groups 
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to decide according to the particularities of the specific situation. If this is done repeatedly, 
authorizations become unreliable and do not promise to ensure the safety of pharmaceu-
ticals.  
Within the supranational context of the EU, the problem is further complicated by a classi-
cal cooperation dilemma. Experience with the largely unsuccessful mutual recognition of 
national authorisations (Gardener 1996, Vos 1999a: 210) demonstrates that the member 
states do not trust each other's authorisation decisions and might even have had an inter-
est to protect their own industry. If every member state protects its own market, none can 
benefit from market integration and the pursuit of short-term interests threatens to jeop-
ardise the emergence of an integrated market for innovative pharmaceuticals.  
Both the dilemma of inconsistent preferences over time and the cooperation problem will 
diminish, if decisions are delegated to an agent that is largely independent from its princi-
pals. To resist the temptation of the concrete situation, the principals must sacrifice their 
discretion in the concrete situation (Elster 1979: 38) and bind themselves to a suitable 
'mast' like Ulysses did in light of the Sirens. The 'mast' available in modern societies is an 
appropriate institutional restraint that creates a 'credible commitment' (Moravcsik 1999 
and Shepsle 1991) and assigns implementing decisions to an actor that is unsusceptible 
to the temptations of specific situations. By this step, two complementary functions are 
separated. The legislator will determine the long-term interests of society, while the gen-
eral rules will be elsewhere applied to numerous specific situations in a way that excludes, 
as far as possible, situation-specific and opportunistic considerations.  
Entrusting an independent agency with far-reaching competencies unfortunately creates 
the danger of 'shirking'. It is not at all clear that a fully independent agency ensures 'good' 
decisions, because it is well known that bureaucracies may well develop and pursue their 
own interests, rather than those of their principals (Moe 1990: 121). They struggle to ex-
pand their spheres of influence and to increase their resources (e.g. budgets, employees) 
(e.g. Dunleavy 1991). Specialized agencies will also create the risk of 'agency capture', if 
they become subject to pressure from organised groups with an interest in certain regula-
tory policies (for the case of pharmaceuticals, see Abraham and Lewis 2000). As small 
groups of actors (e.g. the producers of pharmaceuticals) are much better organised than 
diffuse interests of large groups (e.g. the consumers of pharmaceuticals), an agency 
might tend to prefer the perspectives of some stakeholders to those of others.  
The need to control the activities of an agency appears to militate against the desirability 
of its independence. Principals seem to be in a new dilemma: If they choose to employ a 
strong oversight mechanism (Franchino 2000, Pollack 1997) and closely supervise every 
single decision, agency independence will diminish. And if they establish an independent 
agency, they must soften the grip on the agency's decision-making.  
The dilemma of control and independence may be overcome if we focus in the first place 
on the desirable outcome of a decision-making process, and only in the second place on 
the design of an institution capable of producing these decisions. A regulatory system will 
produce 'good' decisions (Joerges 1999), if they are efficient, solve the underlying prob-
lem, and do not jeopardise the long-term interests of the principals. This necessarily very 
general definition suggests that a good regulatory decision should not be determined ac-
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cording to its distributive effects and to the constellation of power and parochial interests 
among the member states or other interested actors. A good decision will meet the condi-
tions of a Habermasian discourse. Accordint to the 'general principle of discourse', valid 
"are exactly those norms of behaviour which could be agreed upon by all those possibly 
affected, if they were participants in rational discourses" (Habermas 1992: 138, translation 
provided). Decisions will be more likely to be acceptable even to the member states and 
other stakeholders, if they are 'reasonable' and can be convincingly justified.  
If the primary concern of regulatory decision-making is not balancing of stakeholder inter-
ests, but elaboration of reasonable decisions irrespective of their distributive effects, an 
appropriate regulatory system will provide incentives for decision-makers to refrain from 
power-based bargaining and engage in deliberation (discursive arguing). Bargaining is 
commonly defined as an exchange of credible threats and promises based on external 
power resources (Elster 1989). In contrast, deliberation (Joerges/Neyer 1997) is directed 
at influencing the decision process by convincing arguments (Risse 2000, Gehring 2003). 
An institutional arrangement will reduce the opportunities for successful bargaining, if it 
reinforces the relevance of reasonable arguments compared to threats and promises, and 
if it narrows the margin for discrete choice.  
The authorisation of pharmaceuticals with the EMEA in its centre may be considered as a 
success story of European regulatory policy-making. There are at least two indicators for 
the success of the scheme. First, scandals and major problems of the established deci-
sion-making system did not occur so far. An extensive evaluation on behalf of the Com-
mission revealed satisfaction among an overwhelming majority of all groups of stake-
holders, such as national authorisation bodies, pharmaceutical companies and consumer 
groups, with the current authorisation system (Cameron McKenna/Anderson Consulting 
2001). Second, the authorisation scheme is not at all challenged or even significantly re-
vised during the current reform process which will lead to the adoption of an amended 
core regulation.7 Instead, the applicability of the centralised procedure will be extended to 
further categories of pharmaceuticals. 
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the existing institutional arrangement on the per-
formance of the system. We argue that its successful operation is based upon three pil-
lars. The Agency enjoys a strong agenda-setting power in respect to the scientific evalua-
tion of applications (1). An extensive set of legally binding rules that is supervised by an 
active European Court of Justice limits the room for manoeuvre for all public actors in-
volved in the authorisation procedure (2). And an even more detailed set of informal rules 
provides substantive criteria for the making of acceptable decisions (3). Finally, we briefly 
discuss some reform proposals designed to enhance the independence of EMEA (4.).  
The design the authorisation procedure reflects the intention of the member states and the 
Commission to solve a cooperation problem as well as their unwillingness to delegate full 
decision-making competencies to the EMEA. Until the 1990s, marketing was envisaged to 
                                                 
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for 
the Evaluation of Medicinal Products; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use; Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/82/EC on the Community code relating to veterinary 
medicinal products’ in: COM (2001) 404 final, 26.11.2001. 
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rely on the mutual recognition of national authorisations, but the member states did not 
trust each other in this respect (Collatz 1996: 48, Vos 1999a: 210). A centralised authori-
sation procedure was needed to achieve a Single Market for pharmaceuticals. Unwilling to 
delegate this matter to an ever growing Commission or to a newly established regulatory 
agency, the member states chose a complex authorisation procedure involving several 
actors including their domestic authorisation bodies (Kelemen 2002). With its Meroni doc-
trine, the European Court of Justice had already in the 1950s closed the door for the ex-
tensive delegation of formal decision-making competencies to entities not empowered by 
the European Treaties (Türk 1996, Vos 1999a: 200). The Commission was also reluctant 
to create an independent agency, because this might have undermined the 'institutional 
balance' between the established EU-institutions (Majone 2002).  
The centralised authorisation procedure for pharmaceuticals establishes a system of dif-
ferentiated decision-making which allocates particular functions to the different stages and 
actors involved (Gehring 2002: 254-257). It is enshrined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2309/93 (OJ No L 214 of 24.8.1993) and illustrated in Figure 1. A producer submits its 
application to the EMEA which develops a scientific opinion. The scientific work is done by 
an expert committee supported by the administration of the agency. Next is the Commis-
sion which transfers the opinion into the a decision proposal. The formal decision is even-
tually taken by the Standing Committee for Human Medicinal Products, i.e. a Comitology 
committee operating according to the procedure IIIb (Vos 1999b), in which the member 
states are represented. If the member states endorse the proposal by qualified majority, it 
is adopted. Otherwise it is referred to the Council. Apparently, strong control is designed 
to prevent that the agency deviates from the community interest and follows its own 
agenda. 
The formal status of the EMEA within this multi-tiered procedure appears to be quite 
weak. It is obvious that the agency can be strongly controlled by the other actors of the 
procedure. It evaluates applications for the authorisation of pharmaceuticals, but final de-
cisions are taken elsewhere. Hence, regulatory decisions cannot be adopted independ-
ently from the Commission and the member states. They carry the form of Commission 
decisions, and if a European institution will be held legally accountable, it will be the 
Commission. At first glance, the EMEA might appear as a somewhat over-sized scientific 
advisory committee of the Commission which might fulfil the function of a conditional 
agenda setter, depending on agreement with the Commission (Tsebelis 1994).  
To conclude, the EMEA is an unusually strong agenda-setter in the centralised authorisa-
tion procedure. It is always involved in the decision-making process as the first player and 
it is difficult for the other players, namely the Commission and the member states gath-
ered in the Standing Committee, to overrule its scientific opinions. As a result, the sub-
stantive content of the final policy outcome of the procedure over the last eight years was 
entirely determined by the EMEA.  
All actors involved in the authorisation process are obliged to decide according to the sub-
stantive criteria codified in Council Regulation No 2309/93. Apart from narrowly defined 
exceptions to meet moral concerns in some countries (e.g. Irish concerns against phar-
maceuticals for abortion), authorisation decisions shall exclusively rely on the evaluation 
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of the safety, efficacy and quality of a medicinal product. They shall ignore factors like the 
economic well-being of the pharmaceutical industry or financial constraints of domestic 
health care systems. The broad criteria are specified by a detailed ‘Community code relat-
ing to medicinal products for human use’ now enshrined in Directive 2001/83/EC (OJ No L 
311 of 28.11.2001, 67). Apart from fundamental definitions and some procedural rules, 
this code provides detailed standards for the medical tests, which every pharmaceutical 
must pass through and which are subject to examination during the authorisation proce-
dure.  
Judicial litigation over authorisation decisions is not merely a hypothetical possibility. A 
number of cases have already been decided upon, while others are still pending. Hence, 
courts are becoming important actors in the European authorisation procedure, and pro-
ducers are, occasionally, prepared to challenge negative authorisation decisions. The 
relevance of European law and European courts for the authorisation system for pharma-
ceuticals became evident in a judicial struggle about the authorisation of anorectics, i.e. 
medicinal products against obesity. In 2000, the Commission withdrew market authorisa-
tions for an old group of these pharmaceuticals.8 The initial authorisations had been 
granted long before the establishment of the centralised authorisation system by national 
authorisation agencies. It was not only disputed whether the Commission was competent 
to decide upon their withdrawal, the decision was also scientifically badly reasoned. The 
expert committee had based its opinion only on a changing scientific consensus about the 
authorisation of anorectics. The pharmaceutical companies brought the matter in front of 
the European Court of First instance, which rejected the joint positions of the Commission 
and the expert committee in both controversial issues.9 Remarkably, the court did not only 
address the formalities of the cases. It examined the merits of the scientific opinion elabo-
rated by the expert committee in great detail and delved into the substance of the authori-
sation decision. In another decision,10 the European Court of First Instance interpreted the 
requirement of direct concern extensively and widened the scope of potential plaintiffs. In 
this case, an employee instigated proceedings against a positive authorisation decision for 
a pharmaceutical of her own company. The Court of First Instance accepted this action, 
because it judged the involvement of the employee in the medical test of the respective 
product as sufficient to establish a direct concern. With this decision, the asymmetry of 
judicial review in favour of the pharmaceutical industry was partly reduced. 
The shadow of the substantive decision-making criteria and the threat of supervision by 
the European courts create fundamental consequences for the interaction of the actors 
involved in the centralised authorisation procedure. The chain of sub-decisions adopted 
first by the EMEA expert committee, then by the Commission and finally by the Standing 
Committee are not integrated by political power any more, which would reinforce the role 
of the Standing Committee representing interests of the member states, but by European 
law (see Joerges and Neyer 1997). And apart from the procedural requirements, Euro-
pean law enforces the substantive standards enacted by the European legislator. Conse-
                                                 
8 See Commission Decisions: C(2000)452, C(2000)453 and C(2000)608, 9.3.2000. 
9 See judgement of the Court of First Instance in joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and 
T-141/00, 26.11.2002. 
10 See decision of the president of the European Court of First Instance in case T-326/99 R, 7.4.2000. 
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quently, all actors involved in the authorisation procedure are motivated to engaged in 
some sort of collective search for decisions that sincerely apply the binding substantive 
criteria provided for by the legislator. Apparently, the EMEA expert committee is best 
equipped to engage in a deliberation about an appropriate scientific opinion or, as one 
may coin it, in a serious application discourse. Its members are not free to bargain over 
domestic preferences, because scientific opinions have to be justified with convincing rea-
sons. They will struggle to reach consensus at least on the core of their decisions be-
cause an outvoted minority, or a disappointed applicant, can otherwise be expected to 
bring the matter before the Commission or the Standing Committee. The room for ma-
noeuvre of the non-scientific actors within the procedure, namely the Commission and the 
Standing Committee, for non-scientific (i.e. 'political') intervention is almost absent. If ei-
ther the Commission or the Standing Committee raise scientific objections against a sci-
entific opinion of the expert committee, they are not entitled to disregard or amend the 
opinion, but must refer the matter back to the EMEA. If they attempted to raise political 
objections, the decision can be cancelled by the courts.  
Hence, all actors are effectively, not merely formally, bound by the existing substantive 
criteria. The agenda-setting power of the expert committee is further strengthened, but 
only as long as it adheres to these criteria. The non-scientific actors exclusively fulfil a 
tacit oversight of whether the criteria are seriously applied, and provide an additional in-
centive for the expert committee to deliberate sincerely. It is hardly imaginable that they 
deviate from a scientifically sound opinion of the expert committee without eventually be-
ing called back by the European courts.  
In spite of its detailed provisions, the code spelling out the substantive criteria for the as-
sessment of the safety, efficacy and quality of pharmaceuticals does not fully abolish the 
discretion of the expert committee. This is especially due to the fact that an application to 
a medicinal product always requires a trade-off between the general principles of safety 
and efficacy. The more effective a product is, the more side-effects will it usually cause 
(Heilmann 2002). If effects have always to be weighed against side-effects, there will be 
no single best solution, but a range of possible ways of accommodating the contradictory 
principles. The task of balancing principles creates room for manoeuvre for the expert 
committee.  
Instead of exploiting this room for manoeuvre in an ad hoc fashion, the expert committee 
voluntarily limits its own discretion in the single application case by a great number of 
rules of different type. These rules are far more detailed than the substantive decision-
making criteria of the Community code for medicinal products for human use. Usually, 
they are elaborated by various working groups of the expert committee, partly in order to 
provide advise to future applicants, and some emerge from the international conference 
on harmonisation (ICH) founded by the United States, Japan and the EU to harmonise 
their national (or supranational) authorisations of medicinal products as a first step to-
wards a global market for pharmaceuticals. The rules are published on the EMEA home-
page even in draft stages in order to allow interested circles to comment and react upon 
them. As table 3 indicates, the expert committee developed an extensive set of rules of 
different type. 
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The significance of the informal rules is demonstrated by a quite successful guideline in 
the pharmaceuticals sector concerning the risk caused by BSE. Unlike in the foodstuffs 
sector, the risk of BSE in pharmaceuticals was not subject of wide political debates, al-
though many vaccines are produced with bovine sera. Five years before the infectious-
ness of BSE for human beings was proven, and ten years before similarly strict rules for 
foodstuffs were established (Krapohl 2003), the expert committee for pharmaceuticals 
adopted in 1991 its first and already very strict guideline that was slightly revised in 2001.11 
It contained provisions about the origin of bovine material, about the nature of the material 
itself and about the processing of this material. After the guideline received the status of 
EU law in 1999 (because it was taken over into the Community code for human medicinal 
products), all centralised and national authorisations of pharmaceuticals in the EU were 
checked as to their compatibility with these criteria.12 As a result, one national authorisa-
tion from the United Kingdom for a vaccine against polio was withdrawn, because it was 
produced with bovine sera from British cows. Apart from the fact that the EMEA acquired 
some de facto rule-making competence in this case, it turned out that authorisations of 
pharmaceuticals were successfully protected against the risk of BSE with this guideline.  
The extensive reliance on self-created and formally non-binding rules modifies the making 
of decisions. within. By committing itself to adopting decisions that do not contradict its 
own rules, the committee reduces the number of options that could be chosen. It voluntar-
ily cuts the room of manoeuvre for bargaining about member state interests and domestic 
regulatory cultures once again. If bargaining becomes virtually impossible on most as-
pects of a decision, a strong incentive for deliberation is created. And deliberation will be-
come easier, if reasonable and widely accepted criteria exist that provide reliable points of 
reference. The output of a rule-based decision-making system will be more coherent and 
less arbitrary than one based upon ad hoc decisions.  
While there is wide agreement on the success of the existing centralized authorisation 
procedure (Cameron McKenna/Anderson Consulting 2001), proposals to further improve 
the system have been submitted in the current political debate on the reform of the sys-
tem. Most important are the proposals to change the composition of the EMEA-expert 
committee and to weaken, or completely abolish, the supervisory stages of the decision-
making procedure. We argue that there are good reasons to assume that these proposals 
would not result in a better decision-making procedure capable of producing improved 
output. 
Originally, in 1991, the European Parliament had struggled for an expert committee com-
posed of totally independent scientists rather than officials from the national authorisation 
bodies.13 In the current reform process, it proposes a selection of the committee members 
                                                 
11 Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products and Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products (31.5.2001): Note for 
Guidance on Minimising the Risk of Transmitting Animal Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents via Human and Veterinary 
Medicinal Products (EMEA/410/01 rev 1). 
12 Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (28.2.2001): Public Statement on the Evaluation of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (BSE)-risk via the use of materials of bovine origin in or during the manufacture of vaccines 
(EMEA/CPMP/BWP/476/01). 
13 Opinion of the European Parliament to the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) laying down Commu-
nity provisions for the authorization and supervision of medical products for human and veterinary use and establishing a 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (OJ No C 183 of 15.7.1991, p. 178). 
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by the EMEA executive director from a list provided by the member states.14 It is indeed 
somewhat startling that the scientific opinion on the merits of an application is elaborated 
by member states’ regulators rather than by eminent scientists. However, a single person 
cannot handle an application of some 250.000 pages of documents. Currently, the mem-
bers of the committee draw heavily on the support of their domestic agencies. The few 
non-regulators in the committee must rely on the resources of their private institutes which 
are presumably financed predominantly by the pharmaceutical industry. If the committee 
would be changed to a membership of predominantly independent scientists, the EMEA, 
now basically an administrative support unit for the expert committee, would have to ex-
pand its own regulatory competences dramatically. Hence, a reorganised composition of 
the committee would necessarily entail a radical centralisation, and completely abolish the 
existing network character (Dehousse 1997 and Majone 1997), of the regulatory system. 
Moreover, a scientific opinion currently emerges from the confrontation of domestic regu-
latory cultures. Its acceptance within the member states is supported by the fact that do-
mestic authorisation bodies fulfil an important watchdog function already at an early stage 
of the decision-process. A regulatory system that is completely centralised at the Euro-
pean level cannot draw on this kind of inherent checks and balances, nor tap the related 
source of legitimacy.   
The Commission advocates to cut back the supervisory stage of the procedure (COM 
[2001} 404 final). The main argument is that the formally powerful Standing Committee 
does not fulfil any important function in practice, while delaying the final decision. From a 
principal-agent perspective, formal independence of the EMEA would reinforce both the 
responsibility of the agency for its decisions and the accountability of its decision-makers. 
Currently, the system might appear as one of collective irresponsibility. The Commission 
is to be formally blamed for the adoption of false decisions (Collatz 1996: 134), while it 
does not really scrutinize the latter's content. The EMEA actually elaborates the decision, 
but merely acts as a scientific advisory organ in formal terms. And the member states 
might intervene without assuming responsibility. However, the success of the centralized 
authorisation procedure relies on a deliberately established system of checks and bal-
ances of the sub-systems involved. The fact that the Commission and the Standing Com-
mittee did not significantly intervene into the decision process so far does not imply that 
these stages are altogether futile. They establish a permanent threat of intervention in the 
case that unconvincing scientific opinions emerge from the EMEA. If the supervisory 
stages of the procedure were weakened or abolished, the courts remained as the only 
instance able to control the EMEA. It is questionable whether they could fulfil this function 
on their own. Judicial review is still largely asymmetrical, because it is easier for compa-
nies to challenge a negative authorisation decision, than it is for consumers to challenge a 
positive decision. 
In combination, the two proposals would create a completely different system. If member-
ship of the EMEA expert committee would be changed to consist of independent scien-
tists, one might expect increased activity of the Standing Committee dominated by the 
                                                 
14 Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EEC) laying down Community provi-
sions for the authorization and supervision of medical products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (COM(2002)735 final of 10.12.2002). 
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member states, because this would become the principal inlet for their doubts and ques-
tions. If the supervisory stages would be abolished, member state activity within the expert 
committee would gain even more importance. Increased autonomy of the authorization 
system from the member states at both sides of the current procedure would almost inevi-
tably generate less legitimate decisions and might eventually lead to a re-politicisation of 
the whole system. 
During the past decade, a European authorisation system for pharmaceuticals has been 
established that is successful in its regulatory activity and highly accepted by the different 
groups of stakeholders. The system is characterised by an enhanced role for the agency, 
as well as by the participation of a number of other actors, including the member states 
and the European courts. For every single decision, the system drags all actors involved 
into a discourse about the best possible application of generalized substantive criteria. 
The existing procedure establishes a regulatory system, which is at least as likely to pro-
duce ‘good’ policy outcomes as an independent regulatory agency would be. 
4. Conclusion 
The existing decision-making procedure fulfils almost ideally all three conditions for suc-
cessful regulation theoretically derived from section 2. First, the EMEA with its incorpo-
rated expert committee is sufficiently well protected against undesirable intervention of 
parochial interests in order to elaborate decisions irrespective of their distributive conse-
quences. In spite of its lacking independence, it is in fact a very powerful agenda-setter 
that dominates the process as long as it sincerely implements the substantive criteria pro-
vided for by relevant European law. With its extensive set of guidelines and other informal 
rules, it developed a powerful supplementary instrument to keep itself on track and avoid 
less convincing ad hoc decisions. Second, the agency is not free to pursue its own inter-
ests at the expense of community orientation. Far from being able to adopt formal deci-
sions independently, it is subject to two different supervisory mechanisms. The principals 
tacitly supervise its day-to-day decisions. The stages of the Commission and the Standing 
Committee can at any time be activated to serve as an emergency break should powerful 
action be required. Moreover, the whole system comprising the stages dominated by the 
EMEA, the Commission and the member states is subject to supervision by the European 
courts. As a result, the member states are hindered from introducing parochial interests 
into the process either through the expert committee or through the Standing Committee. 
Third, all actors involved are well aware of, and legally bound to, the overall community 
interest which is enshrined in a number of instruments of European law. These substan-
tive standards constitute focal points for the decision-makers and reduce the number of 
options that can be convincingly justified.  
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